Abstract. It is commonly believed that epidemic spreading on scale-free networks is difficult to control and that the disease can spread even with a low infection rate, lacking an epidemic threshold. In this paper, we study epidemic spreading on complex networks under the framework of game theory, in which a voluntary vaccination strategy is incorporated. In particular, individuals face the 'dilemma' of vaccination: they have to decide whether or not to vaccinate according to the trade-off between the risk and the side effects or cost of vaccination. Remarkably and quite excitingly, we find that disease outbreak can be more effectively inhibited on scale-free networks than on random networks. This is because the hub nodes of scale-free networks are more inclined to take self-vaccination after balancing the pros and cons. This result is encouraging as it indicates that real-world networks, which are often claimed to be scale free, can be favorably and easily controlled under voluntary vaccination. Our 5 Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed. 
Introduction
Humankind has always been haunted by different kinds of infectious diseases, from the Black Death in medieval Europe to the recently notorious severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [1] - [3] , avian influenza [4, 5] and swine influenza (H1N1) [6, 7] . Such epidemics usually pose a great threat to health and may cause loss for individuals. Designing effective control strategies has therefore become a task of utmost importance and has attracted renewed interest in the scientific community. For example, several immunization strategies have been proposed, including targeted immunization [8] , acquaintance immunization [9] , ring immunization [10] and so on.
Most of these proposed strategies, however, build on a major premise that vaccination or immunization is compulsory and have not considered the willingness or desire of individuals. Practically, the immunization of individuals is more of a voluntary behavior. This voluntariness is subject not only to social factors such as religious belief and human rights, but also to various other conditions such as risk of infection, coverage of disease and cost of vaccination. For example, a high risk of infection stimulates individual vaccination, while the high cost and side effects of vaccination may result in just the opposite. Thus, the individual faces a dilemma: to vaccinate or not. Furthermore, the coverage of disease and prevalence of vaccination may interact and be intricately interwoven: as disease prevalence is low, people will not favor vaccination, which can cause wide spread of disease. This in turn boosts vaccination and then the rate of infection may drop, which may initiate the next cycle.
Game theory has recently been introduced into voluntary vaccination to explain the dilemma of individual vaccination [11] - [21] . Bauch et al used game theory to explain the relation between group interest and self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy [13, 14] , and they found that voluntary vaccination was unlikely to reach the group-optimal level. Such a shortfall resulted in a substantial increase in expected mortality after an attack of smallpox. Vardavas et al also investigated the effect of voluntary vaccination on the coverage of influenza [15, 16] . Based on a minority game, they found that severe epidemics could not be prevented unless vaccination programs offer incentives. Although these results provide more insights into practical epidemic spreading, the models considered were homogeneous mixing models. That is, a susceptible individual was equally likely to acquire infection from any 3 infectious individual in the population. More practically, a person can be infected only by his/her infectious neighbors [17, 18] . To this end, Bauch et al studied the prevalence of smallpox on real-world social networks under voluntary vaccination, where the node degree is described by a Poisson distribution with mean ν [17, 18] . Recently, it has been shown that many of the degree distributions of social networks are not Poissonian, but follow a power law [22] : P(k) ∼ k −γ , where γ is the degree exponent of scale-free networks. Examples include the web of human sexual contacts [23] , distribution of avian influenza [5] and so on (see [24, 25] ).
The dynamical behavior of epidemics on scale-free networks has been studied by many researchers [26, 27] . The most striking result for scale-free networks is that the presence of hub nodes can facilitate epidemic spreading due to the large numbers of neighbors of such nodes. In particular, the epidemic threshold λ c is zero when the network is sufficiently large [28, 29] . This result is rather discouraging, as it indicates that the disease can persist no matter how small λ c . However, this result is obtained for scenarios without vaccination. In real-world epidemic spreading, where vaccination has always been adopted as an effective control strategy, we are naturally led to the following question: Will the above result also hold under circumstances where the vaccination strategy is considered? To answer this, we consider the spreading of epidemics on various complex networks with the decision of whether or not to vaccinate by balancing the risk of infection and the risk/cost of vaccination. Remarkably, we find that epidemic spreading can be more effectively prevented on scale-free networks [22] than on random networks [30] even under voluntary vaccination. Such exciting results are due to the high inclination of vaccination for the hub nodes.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formalize the problem by introducing game theory and, in particular, by illustrating the individual's dilemma on vaccination.
In section 3, we analyze epidemic spreading on two representative networks under voluntary vaccination strategy, and consider two types of vaccination, i.e. permanent and temporary. Finally, the conclusions and discussion are presented in section 4.
Methods
In this paper, we adopt the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemiological model to investigate the role of voluntary vaccination. In the SIS model, each susceptible (S) node is infected with probability β at each time step if it is connected to an infected (I) node. Meanwhile, the infected agent recovers and returns to the susceptible state again with probability µ. Without loss of generality, we set µ = 1 in this paper. If a susceptible node has k inf infectious neighbors, then the total probability λ that the node becomes infected is
When the epidemic is present, each individual has to decide whether or not to vaccinate by balancing the perceived risk of infection from neighbors versus the cost of vaccination. Due to limited knowledge, each node may have a perceived infection rate β perc , with the perceived infection probability λ perc being
λ perc is either larger or smaller than λ according to each individual's evaluation on the risk of infection [17, 18] . Here, we assume that each individual has full recognition of the risk of infection and we set λ perc = λ.
From the group interest point of view, the optimal case is that the coverage of vaccination is large enough to eliminate the disease. For individuals who always seek personal interest, they will attempt to minimize their own cost/risk by balancing the gain and loss of vaccination. As a result, individuals may refuse to vaccinate if the number of vaccinations among their immediate neighbors is high, which, in turn, may cause the number of infected to increase. To mimic the 'dilemma' of individuals in taking vaccination, we employ game theory and define the cost functions [14] . For individuals, the gain and loss of vaccination can be described by the cost of vaccination P v and the cost of non-vaccination P n :
where c 1 and c 2 are parameters related to the risk of infection and the side effects or cost of vaccination. Each individual will choose vaccination once P n > P v .
In cases where µ < 1, equation (3) can be revised as
This is because the smaller the µ, the longer the duration of the infection (which is indicated by 1/µ) and the higher the cost of infection. Therefore, equation (3) can be rewritten as equation (4) by taking into account the influence of µ. Through extensive simulations, we find that the results obtained from equation (4) are in fact quite similar to those from equation (3).
Main results
As we know, dynamical behavior on complex networks is often affected by the underlying topology. For example, it has been demonstrated that infections on scale-free networks do not have an epidemic threshold, contrary to the random Erdös and Rényi (ER) networks. This indicates that infections can proliferate on scale-free networks. In practice, and especially in terms of disease control, it would also be theoretically interesting to examine how the vaccination strategy described above can influence epidemic spreading. In particular, we are interested in the following problems: How effective can the above immunization strategy be for disease spreading over networks with various structures? Will it still be more difficult to control scale-free networks than random networks?
To this end, we study the epidemic spreading process on two typical complex networks: the scale-free BA network proposed by Barabási-Albert (BA) in 1999 [22] , and the random network, which was first defined by Erdös and Rényi in 1959 [30] . Here the BA and ER networks have the same size N = 2000 and average degree k = 6 (parameters c 1 and c 2 are also the same), so that the effects of structures on the dynamics of epidemic spreading can be fairly compared. All the results obtained here are an average over 50 realizations.
Vaccination can usually be categorized into permanent and temporary vaccination according to its validity. For example, smallpox and varicella vaccinations are permanent once individuals are vaccinated. However, vaccination for diseases like influenza and hepatitis B will lose effect after a few years. Therefore, permanent vaccination and temporary vaccination are considered in the following sections. 
Permanent vaccination
First we study the effects of parameters c 1 and c 2 on the overall spreading of epidemic disease in general (here we take the BA network as an example; other types of networks have similar results too). Specifically, we check how the number of infected and vaccinated changes at each time step for different c 2 by fixing c 1 and β (in our paper, c 1 and β are set as 1 and 0.2, respectively). As is shown in figure 1(a) , a high c 2 value reduces the enthusiasm of vaccination; as a result, the number of infected individuals is proportional to the cost of vaccination c 2 . Apparently, the overall vaccination will be inversely proportional to c 2 ; see figure 1(b) . Now we compare the BA and ER networks on which epidemic spreading proceeds with voluntary vaccination of individuals. Figure 2 (a) portrays the number of infected individuals without the mechanism of voluntary vaccination. We can see that the disease is easier to spread on BA networks than on ER networks under the same conditions. Remarkably, when the mechanism of voluntary vaccination is considered ( figure 2(b) ), we find that the epidemic can be more effectively controlled for BA networks than for ER networks. The control strategy seems to have little effect on ER networks, as the number of infected maintains a relatively high 6 level (more than 100) after 200 steps, where the epidemic on BA networks has already been eradicated. Obviously, this result is encouraging: the previous belief that the outbreak of disease on BA networks was easier than on ER networks no longer holds once the voluntary vaccination strategy is considered.
To comprehend this significant difference observed between ER and BA networks, we check how the number of vaccinations changes with time; see figure 2(c). We find that individuals on BA networks are more inclined to self-vaccinate than those on ER networks at the initial stage. To understand this, we start from equation (3), from which we see that individuals are willing to vaccinate when condition P n > P v holds, that is,
where [] is the floor function. Taking β = 0.2, c 1 = 1 and c 2 = 0.7 as an example, from equation (5), we have
This means that only individuals who have at least si x infectious neighbors (i.e. only individuals whose degree must be larger than six) are willing to vaccinate. For ER networks with k = 6, the probability of having more than six infectious neighbors is quite low. Consequently, the spreading of epidemic cannot be effectively prevented because most of the nodes are unwilling to vaccinate. For the BA network, however, the hub nodes are more likely to be infected due to the large number of connections. Hence, they prefer to vaccinate (according to equation (6)) to reduce their loss, so that the disease can be inhibited effectively. The self-vaccination of the hub nodes is reminiscent of the targeted immunity proposed in [8] . However, the vaccination strategy we used here is adaptive and changing over time, which differs significantly from targeted immunity and is expected to describe the real-world situation more appropriately. To verify our analysis, we define vaccination inclination ρ k for nodes with different k as
where n k is the number of nodes with degree k and v k is the number of vaccinated persons with degree k over the whole time range. Figure 3 plots the vaccination inclination ρ k for nodes with different k under different c 2 . Taking c 2 = 0.7 for example (black line), the vaccination inclination is zero when k 6, then it increases almost linearly with k, and finally saturates at large k. This indicates that the hub nodes are always willing to take self-vaccination to avoid a high risk of infection. Intuitively, the higher the infection rate β, the larger the total number of vaccinated individuals (here the total vaccinated number is the summation of vaccinated individuals during time scale t ∈ [0, 200]). However, we find that the total number of vaccinations is a nonmonotonic function of β, as shown in figure 4. It increases with infection rate β all the way till β 0.7. Then it drops sharply and reaches a steady stage.
This can be explained as follows. When the infection rate β is rather small, only a few of the hub nodes are willing to take vaccination, which cannot eradicate the epidemic completely. As a result, a larger number of nodes will have to take vaccination, which makes the total number of vaccinated individuals increase with β. However, when β reaches 0.7, the cost of non-vaccination P n amounts to
which will be larger than P v = c 2 = 0.7 even if k inf = 1. That is, the neighbors of infected individuals will all take vaccination. Thus, the infected individuals are in fact isolated by the vaccinated nodes, and then the disease can be prevented absolutely. This result also indicates that not all of the susceptible individuals need to vaccinate, since the infected have been totally isolated. 
Temporary vaccination
In this section, we assume that vaccination will lose its validity after a certain time interval τ . This indicates that some susceptibles will have to determine whether to vaccinate or not again once the vaccination loses efficacy. As can be expected, this short-term validity will possibly give rise to more sophisticated behavior of epidemic spreading. Figure 5 shows the effect of τ on vaccination strategy. As can be seen, the larger the τ , the better the voluntary vaccination strategy works, i.e. the infected number drops as τ increases. When the time interval τ is small (τ = 10), the number of both infected individuals and vaccinated individuals will oscillate. For larger τ (τ = 50), damped oscillations are present. The oscillation decays to zero with even larger τ (τ = 100). Now we provide some explanations for why oscillations may arise. At the beginning, with the increase of infected people, more and more individuals will take vaccination gradually, so that spreading is controlled to a lower level. The number of vaccinated individuals also decreases correspondingly. However, the vaccination for certain individuals will lose effect after a period of time τ . Thus a new wave of outbreak will appear (which also leads to more individuals taking vaccination), but not as severe as the previous wave because there are still individuals with efficient vaccination. In this way, the outbreak of disease and mass vaccination occur periodically and settle down to a stable state. It should be noted that the occurrence of oscillation depends on the defined parameters. For example, when β is very small or the number of vaccinations is large, such an oscillation cannot happen.
In the above case, we assume that each individual has the same vaccination time interval τ . In practice, however, strong resistant individuals may have longer vaccination time intervals than weak ones. For example, primary servers on the internet play a crucial role in information transfer and are responsible for maintaining the whole network. Consequently, these servers are always well maintained to ward off computer viruses and have a relatively longer vaccination time interval τ . Taking this into account, we model the vaccination time interval of each individual by τ i = k i (to investigate the influence of hub nodes, we associate τ with the degree). We find that the number of infected is less than the case where τ i ≡ 10 (all the nodes have the same τ ), as is illustrated in figure 6 . Although the average period of validity for τ i = k i is smaller ( τ = 6) than that of τ i ≡ 10, epidemic spreading can still be more effectively controlled in the former. This effectiveness also comes from the longer validity period of hub nodes, which greatly hold back the spreading of epidemics.
It should be noted that in this paper we assume that individuals can obtain information of disease spreading instantly. That is, there is no delay in response to disease. In practice, however, obtaining disease information as quickly as possible may be difficult. To discuss this, we compare the dynamics of epidemics with and without response delay, which is shown in figure 7 . Obviously, the longer the response delay, the larger the number of infected before people become aware and take vaccination. Therefore, the number of infected individuals will increase very rapidly at the beginning (see figure 7(a) ). This in turn leads to more susceptible individuals taking vaccination.
Conclusions and discussions
We present a more practical framework to explore the spreading of epidemics on complex networks under voluntary vaccination, where individuals chose vaccination by balancing the payoff of vaccination and non-vaccination. While previous work suggested that diseases can always prevail on scale-free networks and may be hard to eradicate, our results suggest that epidemics can be more effectively controlled on scale-free networks than on random networks under voluntary vaccination. Such an encouraging conclusion can be attributed to the hub nodes of scale-free networks, the effect of which can be two-fold. On the one hand, they can promote the spreading of epidemics on scale-free networks because of their multiple connections. On the other hand, this negative effect is an advantage for voluntary vaccination, because the hub nodes tend to vaccinate themselves due to their high risk of infection.
From our analysis we can see that the hub nodes' inclination for vaccination plays an important role in determining the effect of vaccination strategy. Sometimes the high cost of vaccination or the misunderstanding of side effects of vaccination can reduce the enthusiasm for taking vaccination. In this case, external incentives such as subsidy of vaccination cost would be helpful in enhancing the vaccination inclination of hub nodes. Although our model is simple, it captures important aspects in real-world epidemic spreading, which has not been fully discussed previously. Our work is expected to provide valuable information for decisionmaking and design more effective disease-control strategy.
